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Abstract
Face obscuration is often needed by law enforcement or
mass media outlets to provide privacy protection. Sharing
sensitive content where the obscuration or redaction tech-
nique may have failed to completely remove all identifiable
traces can lead to life-threatening consequences. Hence, it
is critical to be able to systematically measure the face ob-
scuration performance of a given technique. In this paper
we propose to measure the effectiveness of three obscura-
tion techniques: Gaussian blurring, median blurring, and
pixelation. We do so by identifying the redacted faces under
two scenarios: classifying an obscured face into a group
of identities and comparing the similarity of an obscured
face with a clear face. Threat modeling is also considered
to provide a vulnerability analysis for each studied obscu-
ration technique. Based on our evaluation, we show that
pixelation-based face obscuration approaches are the most
effective.
1. Introduction
From TV news to Google StreetView, object obscuration
has been used in many applications to provide privacy pro-
tection. Law enforcement agencies use obscuration tech-
niques to avoid exposing the identities of bystanders or of-
ficers. To remove this identifiable information, Gaussian
blurring or pixelation methods are commonly used. Me-
dian filtering is also used due to its simple implementa-
tion and its non-linearity, which translates to higher infor-
mation distortion when compared to linear filters such as
the Gaussian filter. These obscuration techniques are able
to successfully prevent humans from recognizing the ob-
scured objects. However, machine learning approaches can
identify these objects using the subtle information left in
the obscured images. In this paper, we focus on the per-
formance analysis of the most common obscuration tech-
niques for face redaction. Specifically, we study Gaussian
Figure 1: An illustration of the scenario studied in this pa-
per. Given N identities with undistorted faces, we want to
see if it is possible to determine the identity of the obscured
query face.
blurring, median blurring, and pixelation to answer the fol-
lowing question: “How effective are these methods at con-
cealing identity?”
Although these approaches are widely used by Internet
news outlets, social media platforms, and government agen-
cies, their performance has not been objectively measured.
The lack of a formal study of these obscuration techniques
makes them vulnerable to attacks. As shown by McPher-
son et al. [7], a deep learning model with a simple struc-
ture is able to identify individuals by analyzing their highly
pixelated and blurred faces. This indicates that human per-
ception is no longer the gold standard to examine the ef-
fectiveness of the obscuration methods. Therefore, we need
to consider them under scenarios that allow us to see if we
can extract the identifiable information from the obscured
face, as shown in Figure 1. In particular, we want to test
whether face identification is possible by comparing a dis-
torted face against a set of undistorted reference faces and
finding the closest match. In order to analyze the vulnerabil-
ity of these obscuration methods, we design multiple threat
models based on the attacker’s knowledge of the obscura-
tion method used. Our simplest threat model assumes that
the attacker has no information of any obscuration methods.
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In the most challenging threat scenario, we consider that the
attacker knows the exact type of the obscuration method and
its hyperparameters used. These unexplored threat models
are necessary to offer a complete vulnerability analysis un-
der realistic situations.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows. First, we design a principal component analysis
(PCA) based method to identify redacted faces under the
face identification scenario. We also examine if deep learn-
ing based methods can be extended to the face verification
scenario. Finally, we provide a comprehensive analysis of
the obscuration performance of Gaussian blurring, median
blurring, and pixelation under different threat models.
2. Related Work
Face Obscuration Methods. The goal of face obscu-
ration is to remove all the identifiable facial information to
prevent identification. As previously mentioned, Gaussian
blurring and pixelation are frequently used in many com-
mercial applications and social media sites. However, these
techniques are not reliable. As we will show in Section 4,
a poor choice for the kernel size of the Gaussian filter is
not able to remove all identifiable information. An extreme
resort to prevent information leaking is to simply gray out
the entire facial region by setting all pixels in the facial area
to a fixed value. However, this approach is rarely used be-
cause its visual effect is unpleasant, especially if there are
many faces to be redacted. To overcome this issue, a vari-
ety of approaches have been proposed that try to balance the
removal of identifiable information while preserving some
facial features.
The first set of approaches, known as k-same methods
[9, 4, 2], attempt to group faces into clusters based on per-
sonal attributes such as age, gender, or facial expression.
Then, a template face for each cluster is generated. These
methods are able to guarantee that any face recognition sys-
tem cannot do better than 1/k in recognizing who a partic-
ular image corresponds to, where k is the minimum number
of faces among all clusters [4]. In Newton et al. [9] and
Gross et al. [4], they simply compute the average face for
each cluster. Therefore, the obscured faces are blurry and
cannot handle various facial poses. Du et al. [2] use the
active appearance model [1] to learn the shape and appear-
ance of faces. Then, they generate a template face for each
cluster to produce obscured faces with better visual quality.
Generative adversarial network (GAN) methods [21, 17]
are able to produce more realistic faces, since their discrim-
inator is designed to guide the generator by distinguishing
real faces from generated faces. Wu et al. [21] propose
a model that generates an obscured face directly from the
original face based on conditional adversarial networks [8].
A contrastive loss is used to enforce that the obscured face is
different from the input face and a structure similarity loss is
used to maintain the correspondence between the two faces.
However, because they need to directly input the original
faces, their obscuration performance is not guaranteed. To
overcome this, Sun et al. [17] propose a model that is able to
generate an obscured head without the original face region.
Privacy Analysis of Obscuration Methods. As men-
tioned in Section 1, although Gaussian blurring and pixela-
tion are widely used, these methods might still leak sensitive
information. Dufaux and Ebrahimi, and Sah et al. [3, 13]
provide an analysis of the obscuration performance of com-
mon face identifiers and show the ineffectiveness of cur-
rent obscuration methods. By using a simple deep learning
model, McPherson et al. [7] also show that obscured images
still contain enough information to perform accurate identi-
fication. They uncover the identity of images obscured with
Gaussian blurring, pixelation, and privacy-preserving photo
sharing (P3) [12] methods. Oh et al. [10] also propose a
semi-supervised model that is able to identify the face un-
der large variations in pose.
To extend the previous literature [3, 13, 7, 10], we first
consider the face identification scenario. By mapping faces
to known identities under different threat models, we ana-
lyze the vulnerability of each obscuration method. How-
ever, the requirement of known identities weakens this kind
of analysis, since query faces usually come from unknown
identities. To overcome this, we also provide a threat anal-
ysis under a more challenging and realistic setup: the face
verification scenario. Specifically, we want to measure the
similarity of an unknown redacted face to clear target faces.
Since it allows the exposure of unknown identities, this sce-
nario is more realistic than the face identification scenario.
3. Proposed Method
To evaluate the performance of the obscuration meth-
ods, we introduce the threat scenarios and face identifica-
tion models.
3.1. Threat Model
In our model, the attacker aims to identify the redacted
faces based on the information still present in the obscured
images. To be clear, we define attacker as a face recognition
system that tries to reveal the identity of the obscured faces.
We design three threat models, which vary on how much in-
formation about the used obscuration approach is available
to the attacker.
• Threat model T1 assumes the attacker has no informa-
tion of any obscuration method, which means that the
attacker is only able to learn the facial features used
for identification from clear faces. During the testing
phase, it needs to extract the facial features from the
obscured faces without any prior knowledge.
Figure 2: Illustration of eigenfaces. A: Example of faces in
the AT&T dataset [14]; B: 10 eigenfaces; C: The average
face among all images.
• Threat model T2 assumes the attacker is aware of some
obscuration methods, but not the same method used in
the testing phase. This model provides more informa-
tion to the attacker, since different obscuration meth-
ods may share similarities in terms of identifying facial
features.
• Threat model T3 assumes the attacker knows the exact
type of the obscuration method and its hyperparame-
ters, like the kernel size of Gaussian blurring or the
pixel size of pixelation. Compared to T2, T3 provides
the attacker with more information to identify the ob-
scured faces.
3.2. Obscured Face Identification
For the obscured face identification problem, we assume
a fixed number of identities. We treat this identification
problem as a classification problem where the number of
classes is equal to the number of identities. Compared to
the verification task, this identification problem is easier to
solve. We can design a simple identifier to compare the per-
formance of different obscuration methods.
PCA is used for reducing data dimensionality and one of
its application is facial recognition (also known as “Eigen-
faces”) introduced by Turk et al. [18]. The eigenfaces repre-
sentation develops a fixed linear basis for the facial appear-
ance with low dimensionality. It represents any face with
the vector of coefficients of the linear combination. Figure
2 shows an example of eigenfaces. We will briefly formu-
late the PCA approach as introduced by Turk et al. [18].
Then, we will present our model for the obscured face iden-
tification problem based on PCA.
We first denote the training images as Γi ∈ RN ,∀i ∈
[1,M ] and Γ ∈ RN×M , whereN is the dimension of image
and M is the number of images in the training set.
The average face shown in Figure 2 is given by
Ψ =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Γi.
The l-th eigenface (eigenvector) ul can be obtained from
the sample covariance matrix C which is defined as
C =
1
M
M∑
i=1
ΦiΦi
T = AAT ,
where
Φi = Γi −Ψ,
A =
[
Φ1 Φ2 . . . ΦM
] ∈ RN×M .
Since the covariance matrixC is inRN×N , it is not prac-
tical to compute its eigenvectors directly. Instead, we com-
pute the eigenvectors νl of the matrix ATA ∈ RM×M and
then compute ul based on the following relationship:
ul = Aνl. (1)
Note that the proof of Equation 1 can be found in [18]. Af-
terwards, we can find a linear combination of these eigen-
faces to approximately reconstruct a new face image by
Φˆi =
K∑
l=1
uTl Φiul =
K∑
l=1
ωlul,
where K is the number of eigenfaces we select (K ≤ M )
and we further denote the projection weights as
Ω =
[
ω1 ω2 . . . ωK
]T
We can then perform face identification given a query
face using a classifier based on its projection weights Ω
from the PCA approach, which can be defined as
yˆ = argmax
y∈Y
p(y|Ω),
where Y = {1, 2, . . . , I} is the identity label set when the
total number of identities is I . Since the number of iden-
tities cannot be infinite, this method can only be applied to
the obscured face identification problem. In our paper, we
use a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with one hidden layer
as the face classifier.
3.3. Obscured Face Verification
The obscured face verification problem is defined as:
given an obscured face and a clear face, decide if the two
faces come from the same person or not.
In order to solve this verification problem, we project
the image vector x ∈ RN to a lower-dimension latent vec-
tor in RD, where faces from the same person are closer to-
gether than faces from different people. Based on this idea,
Schroff et al. [15] design a deep learning model, known as
FaceNet, directly learning the mapping function transfer-
ring from the image space RN to the compact Euclidean
space RD. The distance from each point in the Euclidean
Figure 3: FaceNet model pipeline in training phase, modi-
fied based on Schroff et al. [15].
space represents the facial similarity. The model is trained
with the triplet loss, which enforces a margin between the
faces from the same identity and other faces from differ-
ent identities in the Euclidean space. Define the mapping
function as f : RN → RD and given an image x ∈ RN ,
the corresponding projected point in the Euclidean space is
f(x) ∈ RD. Denote the anchor face as xa, positive face
as xp (with the same identity as xa) and negative face as
xn (with a different identity than xa). The objective of the
triplet loss can be formulated as
‖f(xa)− (xp)‖22 + α < ‖f(xa)− (xn)‖22, (2)
where α is a predefined margin. By rearranging the terms
in Equation 2, we can define the triplet loss function as
Lt(xa,xp,xn) =[‖f(xa)− (xp)‖22 − ‖f(xa)− (xn)‖22 + α]+ ,
where [∗]+ is the function that clips all negative values to
0. Selecting challenging triplets is crucial for fast conver-
gence. Therefore, instead of randomly sampling the valid
triplets, as proposed by Hermans et al. [5], we input a batch
of images with multiple identities into the model and select
all valid triplets to compute the triplet loss. The valid triplet
has three faces with two of them coming from the same per-
son and the surplus one coming from the different identity.
The workflow of the FaceNet model in the training phase is
shown in Figure 3, which inputs a batch of faces, computes
the encoded vectors and calculates the triplet loss to train
the model.
With the knowledge of triplet loss in hand, we can de-
sign our model as shown in Figure 4. The objective for
our model is to ensure that the distance from the obscured
face to the clear face from the same identity is closer than
the distance between two different identities. We use two
separate deep learning models with the same structure to
extract the facial features from the obscured faces xo and
clear faces xc, which are formulated as fo : RN → RD
and fc : RN → RD. Therefore, the projected obscured
face in the Euclidean space is fo(xo), while the projected
clear face in the Euclidean space is fc(xc). We can fur-
ther simplify the notation of the triplet loss function as fol-
lows. Use Lt(xo,xo) for the loss of all valid triplets from
the obscured faces, use Lt(xc,xc) for the loss of all valid
triplets from clear faces and useLt(xc,xo) for the loss of all
valid triplets of the combination of obscured and clear faces.
Then, we can define the loss function of this obscured face
identification model as
L = Lt(xo,xo) + Lt(xc,xc) + Lt(xc,xo),
Figure 4: Obscured face verification model pipeline in train-
ing phase.
For the inference phase, we use obscured face and a
clear face as inputs to the two mapping functions, fo and fc
and compare the L2 distance given the predefined thresh-
old value to determine if the two faces come from the same
person or not. The distance threshold value can be obtained
based on the value that maximizes the identification accu-
racy of the validation set.
4. Experiments
In this section, we describe our experiments. First, we
design a set of experiments for the identification task to pro-
vide a quantified analysis of different obscuration methods.
Then, we extend them to the verification problem using the
deep learning model to test these obscuration methods in
this more realistic scenario.
4.1. Datasets
For the identification experiments, we use two datasets:
the AT&T dataset [14] and the labeled face in the wild
(LFW) dataset [6] and for the verification experiments, we
use the YouTube face dataset [20]. The AT&T dataset pro-
vides 400 images of size 92 × 112 from 40 identities un-
der different lighting conditions and facial expressions. We
choose this dataset in order to compare the results from pre-
vious work [7, 13]. Moreover, the LFW dataset contains
13,000 images from 1,680 identities collected from the in-
ternet, and compared to the AT&T dataset it is more chal-
lenging in terms of scales and image quality. We use this
dataset to provide a comprehensive threat analysis of the
obscuration methods. Lastly, the YouTube face dataset con-
tains 621,126 images of 1,595 identities (about 389 images
per identity) which is much larger than the LFW dataset.
4.2. Obscured Face Identification Experiment
Experimental Design. We design several experiments
to quantify the performance of the three obscuration meth-
ods: Gaussian blurring, pixelation and median blurring. In
order to measure the identification accuracy, based on the
design in Section 3.2, we train a PCA model with 150 eigen-
faces and a 3-layer perceptron (the dimension of the hidden
layer is 1024) as a classifier.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we first train and test our
model using the AT&T dataset to analyze the performance
of Gaussian and median blurring with kernel sizes: 5, 15,
25 and 45, and pixelation with pixel sizes: 2, 4, 8, 16. Since
there are 10 images for each identity, similar to [7, 13], we
use 8 faces for training and 2 for testing. In order to com-
pare the results, we use the top-1 accuracy as our metric.
We use the more challenging LFW dataset to provide a
comprehensive analysis based on the aforementioned threat
models. We remove the identities that have fewer than 25
faces in the dataset, which provides us with 2588 images
from 42 people. We also convert the images into grayscale
and use the Viola-Jones face detector [19] to detect faces.
Afterward, we resize the cropped faces as 92× 112, which
is the same size as the AT&T dataset and choose the kernel
(pixel) sizes as 5, 15, 25 and 45. In this experiment, we
choose larger pixel sizes for the pixelation method than the
experiments using the AT&T dataset to provide a more chal-
lenging situation. To evaluate the effectiveness of the ob-
scuration methods, we use the cumulative match character-
istic (CMC) curve as suggested by Dufaux and Ebrahimi [3]
to compare the identification accuracy with respect to the
identification rank.
We designed three experiments based on the three threat
models to evaluate the obscuration methods. In the first ex-
periment which is designed for T1, the identifier is trained
with the set of clear images and tested with obscured im-
ages. In the second experiment which is designed for T2, the
identifier is trained on both clear and obscured images and
tested with the obscured images of the obscuration methods
not used in the training set. In the third experiment which
is designed for T3, the identifier is trained on both clear and
obscured images and tested with the obscured images em-
ploying the same obscuration methods.
Result. Table 1 shows the results of top-1 accuracy for
face recognition on the different obscured images of the
AT&T dataset. Note that McPherson et al. [7] used a deep
learning model and Sah et al. [13] used a support vector
machine classifier based on the features from the PCA ap-
proach. The Original column indicates that the deep learn-
ing approach yields the best identification accuracy, which
shows that the CNN model is able to handle the facial fea-
tures better than PCA-based approaches including ours and
Sah et al. [13]. For the Gaussian blurring and median blur-
ring, the results indicate that our model is able to identify
Figure 5: Example of the obscured images of the AT&T
dataset with the resolution of 92 × 112 (from left to right
and top to bottom): Gaussian blurring with kernel size 5,
15, 25, 45; Median blurring with kernel size 5, 15, 25, 45;
Pixelation with pixel size 2, 4, 8, 16.
the faces even when a significant amount of facial informa-
tion has been obscured. As shown in Figure 5, when we
increase the kernel size of the Gaussian and median filter,
the facial features such as eyes or noses no longer exist in
the images. Since there are only 10 images for each identity
and only two of them are used for testing, the identifier is
still able to identify the highly obscured face only from its
remaining boundary of the facial region. For the pixelation
method, the results from McPherson et al. [7] yield the best
identification accuracy with the increasing pixel size. This
shows that the CNN model is able to identify the faces even
without noticeable facial features because of the small scale
of the dataset.
The pixelation results from our model show that it has a
better obscuration performance as the pixel size increases.
This is because pixelation is not only able to remove the
facial features, but also the boundary of the facial region.
Comparing the results from pixelation to the two blurring
methods, we can see that the pixelation method is able to re-
move more identifiable information than Gaussian and me-
dian blurring.
Figure 6 shows the results for our PCA method for the
three experiments with different obscuration methods and
different kernel sizes for the LFW dataset. As a baseline,
the results in Figure 6a indicate that without any obscuration
the rank-1 and rank-5 accuracies are about 62% and 85%,
respectively, based on the curve marked as Original.
For treat model T1 in experiment I, comparing the curves
with different kernel sizes, all three methods have a bet-
ter obscuration performance (i.e., lower identification pre-
cision) as the kernel size increases. Comparing the curves
of different methods, the Gaussian and median filters with
a kernel size of 5 almost have no difference from the results
without any obscuration in the testing set. As shown in Fig-
ure 5 their blurring effect is really trivial. The pixelation
method yields the best obscuration performance, especially
Method Original Gaussian Median Pixelation
5x5 15x15 25x25 45x45 5x5 15x15 25x25 45x45 2x2 4x4 8x8 16x16
[7] 95.00 - - - - - - - - 95.00 96.25 95.00 96.25
[13] 88.74 85.25 73.75 61.25 31.25 - - - - 87.50 83.75 70.00 36.25
Ours 92.50 92.50 91.25 83.75 91.25 90.00 95.00 86.25 86.25 96.25 83.75 79.00 60.00
Table 1: Obscured face identification top-1 accuracy with the AT&T dataset.
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(a) CMC plots of experiment I.
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(b) CMC plots of experiment II.
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(c) CMC plots of experiment III.
Figure 6: CMC plots for obscured face identification. The bold curve indicates the best obscuration method for each experi-
ment.
for the pixel size of 45. Moreover, the Gaussian and median
filters with a kernel size of 45 also have a good performance,
but it is still worse than the pixelation method with a pixel
size of 15, 25 and 45.
For treat model T2 in experiment II, after adding the ob-
scured images to the training set the identification precision
of Gaussian and median filters increases, while the results
of the pixelation method almost remain the same. This is
caused by the pixelation with a large pixel size, which not
only removes the identifiable facial features like eyes and
mouth, but also the outline of the face as mentioned in the
previous experiment. Although the Gaussian and median
filters can also obscure the identifiable information, the re-
maining facial outline provides the classifier information for
identification.
For treat model T3 in experiment III, if we train with
the obscured images with the same obscuration operation
used in the testing set, the obscuration performance for all
methods will decrease. This can be especially seen for the
pixelation method with a pixel size of 45, although it still
achieves the best performance.
In summary, based on the results of obscured face identi-
fication, the pixelation method achieves the best obscuration
performance compared to the Gaussian and median blurring
methods.
4.3. Obscured Face Verification Experiment
Experimental Design. As previously mentioned, the
deep learning method [7] yields the best performance even
with the biggest pixel size. However, since the AT&T
dataset experiment only has two images per identity for test-
ing, the performance could be different when dealing with a
larger dataset. Therefore, in order to further examine the ob-
scuration performance of a larger dataset, we design a verifi-
cation experiment. As mentioned in Section 4.1, we use the
YouTube face dataset for this verification experiment and
we split the dataset into training, validation, and testing with
ratios of 0.6, 0.2 and 0.2 with cropped faces of 112 × 112.
We also do random rotation ranging from [−30◦, 30◦] for
data augmentation to create more variation of facial poses.
As suggested by Hermans et al. [5], we empirically choose
a batch size of 128 with 4 images per identity. For the deep
learning structure, we choose the VGG [16] model with out-
put dimension 128 for both the obscured mapping function
fo and the clear mapping function fc, since this model has
been successfully implemented for facial recognition [11].
For the experiment design, we continue the third experiment
(threat model T3) in Section 4.2, which assumes that we
know the obscuration type and train/test on the same obscu-
ration method, including Gaussian blurring, median blur-
ring, and pixelation. As shown in Figure 7, we still choose
the same kernel/pixel sizes as in the previous identification
experiments (5, 15, 25 and 45). During the testing phase,
we sample face pairs from the same identity and different
identities evenly. For the performance metric, since the face
verification problem is just a binary classification problem,
we choose the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
to examine the performance and use its area under the curve
(AUC) as the numerical metric.
Result. As shown in Figure 8, similar to the results
in Section 4.2, with the increase of kernel/pixel size, the
three obscuration methods have a better obscuration perfor-
mance. Observing the different obscuration methods with
Figure 7: Example of the obscured images of YouTube face
dataset with the resolution of 112 × 112 (from left to right
and top to bottom): Gaussian blurring with kernel size 5,
15, 25, 45; Median blurring with kernel size 5, 15, 25, 45;
Pixelation with pixel size 5, 15, 25, 45.
the same kernel/pixel sizes, the pixelation method yields
the best obscuration performance, which confirms the re-
sults from Section 4.2. The performance of pixelation with
a pixel size of 5 is even better than the Gaussian and median
blurring with a kernel size of 15. Based on the visual effect
from Figure 7, the abrupt edges generated from the pixe-
lation method remove more identifiable facial information.
Comparing the results of Gaussian and median blurring, the
median blurring with a kernel size of 45 is slightly better
than Gaussian blurring, since the facial details (eye region
or nose) are completely removed when the kernel size in-
creases.
As shown in Figure 9, we also produce visualization re-
sults to illustrate the performance of each obscuration meth-
ods in a more realistic scenario. We pick 6 clear faces from
the YouTube face dataset (as shown on the right side of each
image in Figure 9) and select an obscured image from the
testing set. We intentionally add several challenging refer-
ence faces among the 6 faces in order to create extra diffi-
culty for the model, like the first, fourth and fifth faces. The
bar next to each clear face indicates the distance between the
clear face and the obscured face to its immediate left and the
highlighted green bar represents the face with the minimum
distance. Note that the correct match is the second face from
the top. Therefore, our model can correctly detect the ob-
scured face from the Gaussian and median blurring with a
kernel size of 15 (as shown in Figure 9a and 9b) and fails
on the pixelation method with a pixel size of 5 (as shown in
Figure 9c).
In summary, based on the results, the pixelation method
achieves the best obscuration performance, which is similar
to the results in the identification experiments.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of
three obscuration methods: Gaussian blurring, median blur-
ring, and pixelation. We design a set of experiments to ex-
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Figure 8: ROC curve for the experiments of obscured face verification. The bold curve indicates the best performance of this
experiment.
(a) Gaussian with kernel size of 15. (b) Median with pixel size of 15. (c) Pixelation with pixel size of 5.
Figure 9: Obscured face verification for different obscuration methods. The 6 small images on the right side of each figure
are the clear faces. The bar next to each image is the Euclidean distance to the obscured face on the left (the green bar is the
one with minimum distance). The correct clear face is the second face from top.
amine if we are able to identify the obscured faces using
a PCA based method and a deep learning based method.
Based on the experiment results, we show that the pixelation
method achieves the best performance since it brings abrupt
edges, which improve the effectiveness of the face obscura-
tion. Obscured faces using Gaussian and median blurring
with a big kernel size are still able to be identified by our
methods, although they are already unrecognizable by a hu-
man. Therefore, the designers of redaction systems need to
be aware of choosing an effective obscuration method like
pixelation and cannot only rely on human perception to de-
termine a successful obscuration.
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